Interview: “Kyoto isn’t a toothless tiger”

Maria Socorro is a Compliance Officer at the UNFCCC. She believes the compliance mechanisms contain the right mix of carrot and stick.

DW-Radio: How likely does it look at this stage that the signatory nations will meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol?

Maria Socorro: It’s too early to tell. We just got most of the fourth national communications of the annex one parties -- that is, the parties that have these reduction obligations. Those are being reviewed. It’s too early in the game really to say whether they’ll meet their obligations or not. There are some indications that these parties are taking measures to try and comply with their targets and that some of them will need to use the flexibility mechanisms because domestic actions themselves will not be enough.

When you say the flexibility mechanisms you‘re talking about things like emissions trading. Does emissions trading make it easier for countries to dodge their obligations?

Well, dodge is not the term I would use. But I would say the theory of these flexibility mechanisms -- emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism -- is that if it becomes too expensive to try and reduce emissions domestically, perhaps because a country has already reached a certain level of energy efficiency, for example, and the marginal cost of more policies domestically would be too high, then investing in projects or buying credits from other countries might be more economically feasible for them. So, in theory, it will make it easier for them to meet their targets if they have that elbowroom.

If they fail to meet their targets, what framework is in place to enforce their obligations?

The enforcement branch of the compliance committee would … require the parties to draw up a compliance action plan which analyzes why they did not meet their targets and proposes how they intend to meet their target within a certain period in that plan and its implementation would then be monitored. Also, they would be given a penalty. There would be a carry-over of 130 percent of whatever the shortfall is, to the next commitment period. In other words, their reduction commitment in the second commitment period would have an add-on that is equal to 130 percent of what they didn’t meet in the first commitment period and their eligibility to trade using credits under emissions trading would be suspended.

If a country doesn’t meet its commitment, is it any more likely that they’ll meet the harsher target if they fail to meet the initial target?

It’s difficult to tell. If part of the reason why they don’t meet the target is that they miscalculated the time lag between policies they’ve implemented and when they actually take effect, then it’s still likely that they’ll meet the targets. Also, maybe by that time they would have become more comfortable with the system and know better how to meet the targets and so with increasing efficiency and other additional mechanisms then we can remain optimistic.

Will there be a way of determining whether parties willfully neglected their targets or whether it is just a matter of time lag in implementing policies?

Lack of any policies and measures might be taken as an indication of a lack of will, for example. And on the other hand, if they say they have policies and measures -- or that at least they are trying -- then you can that see maybe that it’s a problem of capacity or a problem of system. The fact that many of these countries have agreed to this kind of a system is something to be positive about, so in the end I don’t think the Kyoto Protocol is a toothless tiger.

Plus, there are many other things happening in parallel to what’s happening in the protocol that complement the momentum that was built by its entry into force so I don’t think that we should be so pessimistic.