China, US and the War on Terror

Based on the overall situation in world politics, strength of bilateral conflicts and inner-political mood swings, US policy towards China has fluctuated for decades between engagement and containment. Every new US government would at first deal with China in confrontational terms, only to opt for a pragmatic and cooperative approach after a while.

In 1997, then President Clinton promoted China's status to that of a "strategic partner." George W. Bush demoted it to the level of "strategic competitor" during his election campaign. After the collision of a US reconnaissance jet with a Chinese bomber over the South China Sea in April 2001, relations between the two countries took an essential turn for the worse.

Against this background, it was striking that Jiang Zemin, then China's president and secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, picked up the phone and called Bush immediately after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He not only expressed his condolences and condemned the attacks, but also promised China's active support in the fight against international terrorism.

This decision by the Chinese leadership came with internal risks. At the time, an anti-American sentiment was still virulent, especially among the young people in China. This sentiment was expressed, for example, in numerous articles on the Internet, which propelled the view that the US got what it deserved on Sept. 11 as a retribution for its power politics and its self-chosen role as the world's policeman.

A new beginning?

Jiang Zemin saw in the challenge of the terrorist attacks, however, a new chance to improve the relationship between China the United States. He started with the assumption that his country could not in the long term do without cooperating with the US if its modernization was to proceed successfully. That is exactly what the Chinese leadership sees as its main goal. To fulfill this goal, the Chinese leaders declared war on the "three forces:" separatism, terrorism and extremism.

As a member of the alliance against international terrorism, China is also hoping that the world will show more understanding for its harsh actions, above all in the north-western province of Xinjiang, where more than 18 million people are Muslims. In the 1990s alone, hundreds of incidents took place there. Under the title of "war on terror," Beijing also wanted to win legitimacy for its struggle against separatism in Taiwan and the Falungong movement.

Bush's calculation

But it was also Bush who openly sought Chinese support, not only in the UN Security Council, where China holds the power of veto, but also in concrete actions in the war on terror. That's why China was helpful in Pakistan in the fight against the Taliban and in other cases. Bush, on the other hand, showed his willingness to cooperate with the Chinese in August 2002 when he put an Uigurian group -- the so-called East Turkistan Islamic Movement -- on the list of known terrorist organizations. But the Chinese hope of gaining political capital out of joining the fight against terrorism subsequently proved to be utopian.

Between Sept. 11, 2001 and the end of 2002, Jiang Zemin met George W. Bush three times. This at least improved the rhetoric and atmosphere of bilateral relations. At that point, the US government spoke of an "open, constructive partnership" with China. Engagement seemed to have won over containment.

Fears revisited

Five years after the attacks on New York and Washington, it is time to draw provisional conclusions. Experts believe that the subsequent events did not unfold in a positive light for China. China did not win the trust of the United States in this period. The US population still sees China as the greatest challenge to the country's position as the world power. The Congress is preparing a bill which would put a 27-percent tax on all products which carry the label "Made in China." The State Department replaced its division heads who were experts on China.

Before Sept. 11, the US military presence was limited to the region east of China, above all in Japan, Korea and some south-eastern Asian countries. Now, however, China is confronted with American soldiers in the western part of the continent as well. The Uzbekistan contingent left the country in July 2006, but troops remained in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. The placement of US troops in central Asia was agreed upon with Russia, but China was not consulted on this matter at all.

Shortly after Sept. 11, Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi sent four Japanese battleships to the Indian Ocean. In doing so, Japan bid farewell to its principle of not participating actively in the collective defense of the region. There is a lot of anger in China about Japan's gradual abandonment of its pacifist constitution, but also an awareness that counter-measures are not possible.

Additionally, Washington lifted its arms embargo against India, but left it in place for China. India and the US agreed on cooperation in the strategically important areas of civilian nuclear technology and space travel, even though New Delhi has to this day not signed the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, the US agreed to train Vietnamese soldiers. Bush was also the first US president to visit Mongolia. He promised $20 million (15.6 million euros) of annual military aid and joint US-Mongolian military maneuvers.

Consequently, China sees itself challenged nowadays by US military activities on almost all fronts. No wonder that, five years after Sept. 11, the Chinese fear of being encircled by superpower US is greater than ever.