Total Concept for Afghanistan

DW-WORLD: How do you see the situation in Afghanistan? Has the NATO mission failed?

Herfried Münkler: At this point in time, you can't make such a general conclusion. As far as the question of the success of NATO's mission is concerned, Afghanistan is a relatively diverse country. The situation in the South and the Southeast is completely different than that in the North. The current discussions have more to do with perceptions in our own countries -- in the US and the nations of western and central Europe. We're realizing that our mission and presence there will last at least a decade and not a couple of months or years. And that's more than just the physical presence of rotating troops.

It also means we have to be prepared to commit more troops and get more deeply involved. NATO will have to do everything that's required, and it will do that to ensure that this mission doesn't fail. If that were to happen it would be a catastrophe for the security of the West.

What specifically do you think needs to be done? Are there radical changes that need to be made on the concrete or the general level to turn the situation around?

In order to master the situation, we need more calm. We need to stifle the hectic rumor-mongering that stems from incompetence. That's very important.

One key point is that we're dealing with a war-by-coalition here. There are a number of actors, which has to do with the historical genesis of the NATO mission and the special project that is Afghanistan. The governments of the countries involved all have to take into account the sensibilities of their respective peoples. Those sensibilities differ, and the result is that there's no comprehensive design to the mission.

Secondly, Enduring Freedom and the efforts of ISAF to stabilize Afghanistan have run parallel to one another. After five years, the question is whether that's sensible, or whether one needs a total concept that would integrate Enduring Freedom and ISAF. Up until now, people have accepted the current situation as a provisional solution -- in the hope that the whole thing would be over very quickly. Now we're recognizing the difficulties and problems. In terms of strategy, we have to ask how we can bring Enduring Freedom and ISAF together.

Those are the general points. The specific ones are the arguments and animosities that result from what I call war-by-coalition. The nations involved in the South -- especially Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands -- are upset to an extent because the situation in the North is so much less problematic.

On the other hand, that's what was expected from the very start. It's not surprising when we recall which territories were affiliated with the Northern Alliance and which with the Taliban. It's possible that the mission in the South has focused too much on the use of military force and not enough on administrative, social and economic stabilization. But that's easy to say from here. I'd say we now have to draw a balance and get used to the fact that we need at least a decade to develop an overarching design.

Other nations have started a discussion about whether Germany should send troops to Southern Afghanistan. Should Germany get involved there?

Well, from Germany's perspective, the mission has been fairly successful in achieving its modest aims. The situation is completely different in the North than in the South and requires different skills from the soldiers. I have serious doubts as to whether it would work to throw troops from the North into the South for two or three weeks of battle and then withdraw them to the North. The situation with the trust of the populace in the troops is very different in the North. That's not only normal -- it's also desirable.

Deploying German troops in the South would probably be a military mistake. That would mean the Bundeswehr would have to transfer units that are primarily for combat to the South, a move which would hardly be feasible considering our domestic political situation right now. Our friends from Canada, the Netherlands and Great Britain will have to accept the original division of tasks that everyone agreed to at the start.

It's bad form, so to speak, to try to solve their own problems at meetings of NATO parliamentarians through provocations that are aimed at drawing Germany further into the conflict. On the other hand, we in Germany have a medium-term problem insofar as our missions are too concentrated on a mixture of aid and social work. We've never seriously grappled with the fact that such missions are also about enforcement. But that's not something that you can change in German society from one day to the next.

Things won't just be different because NATO holds a meeting and reaches a decision, and then it's just rammed through. For that we'll need time.

Professor Herfried Münkler holds a chair in Political Theory at the Alexander-von-Humboldt University in Berlin.