Power grab
October 17, 2009
A few weeks ago, Iran's biggest privatisation deal ever was closed. On Sept. 27, Etemad Mobin Development, a consortium consisting of three companies bought a controlling stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran for eight billion dollars. Soon after the sale was made public, alleged links between members of the consortium and Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard were discussed in the media and on the internet. On Oct. 10, according to Iranian newspaper reports, the government's inspection office announced it was investigating the deal.
Whether or not a clear connection between the consortium and the Revolutionary Guard can ultimately be established, the incident highlights the stature the military organisation has gained beyond its original purpose. It is widely accepted that the elite group does possess the financial and managerial capabilities to shoulder the biggest transaction made in the history of Iran's stock market. In fact, according to various estimates, the Revolutionary Guard today control up to 20 to 30 percent of the Iranian economy.
That is a far cry from the organisation's roots - as its name proclaims - as protector of the Islamic Revolution. Founded in 1979, the elite force is independent of Iran's regular military and accountable only to the country's supreme leader. Because they operate independently of Iran's army, very little is known about their inner workings and outside networks. They have their own army, navy and air force units and their size is estimated at around 130,000 troops. In addition, they are in charge of the Basij, the militia that was instrumental in quelling the protests following the country's presidential elections last summer.
Economic role
"I think it's probably stronger than it has ever been before," is how Rouzbeh Parsi, an Iran analyst with the EU's Institute for Security Studies, characterises the Guard's position in Iranian society. "That does not mean they can decide things on their own, but it does mean that as a variable in the bewildering Iranian equation we have to allot them much greater weight than we had to before."
What's more, say experts, while ordinary Iranians could feel the pinch of possible tougher international sanctions against Tehran, the Guard could ultimately even profit from such a move. "They have been created under sanctions, they have been created under pressure and indeed they would be the ones who would benefit in one way or another from sanctions," argues Walter Posch, an Iran expert with Austria's National Defence Academy.
Because of the organisation's role in border security, it is assumed that it plays a large role in the country's booming black market. It also controls a large construction company and has interests in various other sectors.
"It's sizable," says Posch of the Revolutionary Guard's economic influence and adds: "The Guard play an increasing role in many key industries."
Transformative power
Their steadily rising economic and political clout could eventually transform the entire country. It's not a far-fetched scenario, but unfortunately a realistic possibility that Iran could slowly morph from a theocratic into a military regime, says Parsi. While he considers an Egyptian-style military coup unlikely, he points to Turkey as a more fitting model.
"If you look at the establishment of the Turkish republic you have the military as a very, very strong component which is also ideologically geared toward maintaining some more or less fictitious idea of Atatürk's legacy that in a sense outlives the rest of the society which it is supposedly guarding," argues Parsi. "And in a sense we can say that perhaps the Revolutionary Guard in Iran are mimicking that development."
Posch agrees: "I think the Iranian regime now increasingly goes down the road of what I would call authoritarian normalisation." He notes that a dominant role of the military is a standard feature of the region. "That has been the case of Pakistan, until recently it was the case in Turkey, it's the case for Algeria and Egypt." The result, concludes Posch, will be a more streamlined and less opaque Iranian system of power.
In this new system religion will still play a major role: "But the generation of radical clerics will be sent into retirement if you look at the age of these people," says Posch. "And yes, the military will have a bigger say. It will be a very Islamic military, it will be Islamic and it will be revolutionary, but in the end it will in one way or another be de-clericalized."
Asked about what the West can do to influence this development, Parsi's answer is clear: "I don't think there is anything the West can do to stop that trend. I think one of the things we have to understand from the outside is how very little we can affect anything inside Iran."
Author: Michael Knigge
Editor: Rob Mudge